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evils threaten the welfare of the children, the status quo
at the time the appeal was taken will not be disturbed.
[4] Neilma has requested costs and counsel fees incurred
in this proceeding. As pointed out in Lerner v. Superior
Court, ante, p. 676 [242 P.2d 321], the trial court has
jurisdiction to award suit money in original proceedings in
this court arising out of divorce actions in the trial court.
The motion will be denied without prejudice to its renewal
in the trial court.
The petition for an order permitting the minor children
to leave the state temporarily pending appeal is denied. The
motion for counsel fees and costs is denied without prejudice.
Gibson, C.•J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
.T., and Spence, J., concurred.

The opinion was modified to read as above printed on April
18,1952.

[So F. No. 18262.

In Bank.

Mar. 27, 1952.]

M. J. ORELLA, Appellant, V. MAY JOHNSON et a1.,
Respondents.
[1] Trusts - Evidence to Establish. - Evidence of conversation
which plaintiff had with his deceased wife, wherein she allegedly promised that if he would convey certain property to
his stepdaughter, it would'be reconveyed to him on his request,
is inadmissible to establish that stepdaughter agreed to hold
property in trust for plaintiff in absence of proof that his
wife was the stepdaughter's agent.
(Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1870(5).)
[2] Evidence-Res Gestae-Declarations During Transaction.Unless the statute of frauds is a bar to the establishment of
It constructive trust, evidence of a conversation which plaintiff had with his decl'asl'd wife, wherein she allegedly promised that if he would coun'y certain property to his stepdaughter, it would he reconveyed to him on his request, is
admiRsihle as part of the transaction in which plaintiff conveyed his property to his stepdaughter, and is relevant to
prove both the reaRon for the conveyance and what plaintiff
intendl'd to accomplish by it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1850.)

[2J See Ca1.Jur., Evidenct', § 340; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 664.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 332(1) i [2] Evidence, § 282;
[3-6] Trusts, § 149; [7] Trusts, § 160.
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[3] Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Oral Agreement of
Grantee.-Where grantor conveys property to another in relianee on oral promise of latter to hold the property in trust for
the grantor or a third pprson and the grnntee subsequently
repudiates the trust, a eonstructive trust may be enforced
against the grantee if the conveyance was induced by fraud
or if there was a confidential relationship between the parties.
(Civ. Code, § 2224.)
[4] Id.-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Oral Agreement of Grantee.-When grantee refuses to perform his oral promise to
hold the property in trust for the grantor or a third persen,
it is either actual fraud which induced the conveyance, or
constructive fraud arising from a confidential relationship
coupled with breach of the oral promise, which brings into
operation the provisions of Civ. Code, § 2224, declaring that
one who gains a thing by fraud is an involuntary trustee of
the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would
otherwise have had it.
[5] Id.-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Oral Agreement of Grantee.-Since under Civ. Code, § 2224, the trust is in favor of
the person who, but for the fraud, "would otherwise have
had" the property, the effect of its application when the
grantee refuses to perform his oral promise, is to enforce the
trust in favor of the intended beneficiary.
[6] Id.-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Oral Agreement of Grantee.-Although oral promise by grantee to reconvey property
to grantor is unenforceable under statute of frauds, unjust·
enrichment by grantee on his repudiation of such promise
should be prevented by compelling him to make specific restitution to the grantor upon evidence either that grantor conveyed his property in reliance on an oral prom'ise to reconvey
it to him, or that the conveyance was induced by fraud.
[7] Id.-Constructive Trusts-Evidence.-Evidence that plaintiff's
stepdaughter accepted and recorded a grant deed by which
plaintiff and his wife, the stepdaughter's mother, conveyed to
her the property on which they had been living; that she
allowed her parents to continue to live on the property after
the deed to her was executed; that despite her disapproval
she provided the funds for their purchase of other property
from the proceeds of property sold by them; and that she
stated to plaintiff she could not see why he wanted to spend
money in repairs of the property last purchased, "but it is

[3] Grantee's oral promise to grantor as giving rise to a trust,
notes, 35 A.L.R. 280; 45 A.L.R. 851; 80 A.L.R. 195. See, also,
Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 31 j Am.Jur.,~rusts, § 231.
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your 1II01lf'Y, you can uo so," shows that she was acting as
tl"llst('(' for plaintiff with respect to his real estate transactions and supports un ill ference that she ratified the transaction undertaken on her behalf.

APPEAL from a jUdgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Cruz County. James L. Atteridge, Judge. Reversed.
Action to impress a trust on realty and for an accounting.
Judgment of nonsuit reversed.
Alfred J. Harwood for Appellant.
J. Frank Murphy and Eugene J. Adams for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment
for defendants entered after the granting of a motion for
nonsuit. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to
plaintiff and disregarding conflicts, the evidence may be
summarized as follows:
In 1933 plaintiff received from his parents as his separate
property a home known as the Harder Road place in Alameda
County. At that time he borrowed $1,000 from defendant
·May Johnson, his stepdaughter, to payoff a mortgage on
the property. Plaintiff and his wife lived on the property,
and in 1938 he and his wife executed a grant deed conveying
it to May. In 1941 the property was sold for $3,900, which
was paid to May, and the deed was executed by her. She
retained the $1,000 plaintiff owed her and the $400 interest
due thereon. One thousand eight hundred dollars of the
$3,900 was used to purchase a new home for plaintiff and his
wife, known as the Winton Road place. Title was taken in
May's name. In 1943 the Winton Road property was sold for
$4,500, and $2,300 of this amount was used to purchase property in Santa Cruz. In December, 1947, plaintiff learned for
the first time that title to the Santa Cruz property was in May's
name. Shortly thereafter his wife died, and he asked May to
convey the property to him. She refused and thereafter conveyed the property to herself and her daughter as joint tenants. Plaintiff brought this action to impress a trust on the
property and to obtain an accounting of the amounts May had
realized through the sales of the Harder Road and Winton
Road properties. Plaintiff sought to prove that the 1938 conveyance to defendant was intended as a deed of trust to secure
his indebtedness to her and that she accepted the deed on

)
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the understanding that she would reconvey the property to
him on his request.
To prove the alleged oral trust plaintiff sought to introduce
l'vidence of al conversation he had with his wife that resulted
in his executing the deed to May. The trial court excluded
this evidence on the ground that any statements made by
plaintiff's wife would not be binding on May in the absence
of proof that plaintiff's wife was acting as May's agent ill
the transaction. Plaintiff then offered to prove that his
wife stated to him: "Honey, I have got a proposition May
wants me to put to you; she wants you to make a deed of
trust of the property because she is afraid you will be involved in an automobile accident and the people who are
injured might come on the property. . . . " In response
plaintiff said, "yes, with the understanding that any time
he wanted the property back in his name May Johnson would
deed it back to him." His wife then said, "Yes, that is
okay."
[1] In the absence of proof that plaintiff's wife was May's
agent, the evidence of this conversation was inadmissible to
establish that defendant agreed to hold the property in trust
for plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(5).) [2] Unless,
however, the statute of frauds is a bar to the establishment
of a constructive trust in this case, this evidence was admissible as part of the transaction in which plaintiff conveyed his property, and was relevant to prove both the
reason for the conveyance and what plaintiff intended to
accomplish by it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1850; Setkman v. Bulkey, 9 Cal.2d 21, 24 [68 P.2d 961]; Simons v. Bedell, 122
Cal. 341, 349-350 [55 P. 3, 68 Am.St.Rep. 35]; Airola v.
Gorham, 56 Cal.App.2d 42, 50-52 [133 P.2d 78] ; Williamson
v. Kinney, 52 Cal.App.2d 98, 103-104 [125 P.2d 920].) It
is therefore necessary to consider the possible theories under
which plaintiff might enforce a constructive trust against
defendants in the light of the evidence presented.
[3] If a grantor conveys property to another in reliance
on the oral promise of the latter to hold the property in trust
for the grantor or a third person and the grantee subsequently repudiates the trust, it is settled that a constructive
trust may be enforced against the grantee if the conveyance
was induced by fraud or if there was a confidential relationship between the parties. (Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525,
527-529 [17 P. 689, 7 Am.St.Rep. 189]; Odell v. Moss, 130
Cal. 352, 358 [62 P. 555] ; Jones v. Jones, 140 Cal. 587, 590
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[74 P. 143]; Lam'icella, Y. Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 65-67
[118 P. 430] jIll/bel' v. H1lber. 27 Ca1.2d 784, 790 [167 P.2d
70S] ; sec Hest., Trusts, § 44.) Such trusts are enforced under
thr provisions of seetion 2224 of the Civil Code that "One who
g-aills a thillg b:' frand . . . is . . . an involuntary trustee
(If thr thing" gailW(J, for the benefit of the person who would
othrrwisl' haw had it." [4] It is either the actual fraud
that i11clneed the ('Oll\·r.yaIWe, or tl](> constructive fraud arising fl'om the eOllfi(lential rellltionship coupled with the breach
of thE' oral promise, that brings the provisions of the section
into play. (B"isoll Y. Brisoll, supra; Laun:cella v. Lauricella,
suprll; Robrrtsoll Y. SlIl1IllIcril, 39 Cal.4pp.2d 62, 65-66 [102
P.2d 347 J.) [5] Since under this section the trust is in
fllyor of thE' prrson who, but for the fraud, "would other,,-jsr haY(' ll/ld" thE' propert:', the effect of its application
",11<'11 thE' gTantE'r refuses to perform his oral promise, is to
I'lIffl1'eE' thl' trust ill favor of the intended beneficiaQ'. (Lall";('(7711 Y. Lallricr17a, slIpra; Cooney Y. Glynn, ]57 Cal. 583,
;;S7 1108 P. 506] : srr S('(fr.~ v. R1I7e, 27 Ca1.2d 131, 139 [163
P.2d 443J ; RE'st., Trnsts. § 45.)
[6] '\Vhether 01' not there is a confidential relationship or
whptl]('r or not the original transfer was induced b:' fraud,
fllr fad remains that thE' In'ante? will bE' unjustl:- enriched,
if Ilf' is allO\\'('(l 10 repndiatr his promise and retain tIle propPl'tr. A('eor<li11gl:-. tIl<' vir,,- lIas bpen forcefulI~' adyocated
that althongh thp !!J'Hnter ea11not hr compelled to perform his
prolllisp ill vir", of thf' statutE' of frauds, unjust enrichment
shOll hi lw PI'pYrlltp(l h:' (,(lllllwlling' him to mak!' specific restitntiol1 to thr grantor. (SE'r 1 Scott on Trusts. § 44, p. 248,
all(l allthoritips ('iten.) This view is supported b:' the rule
111nt a pnrehasrr 1I11(lpr an invalid oral contract to buy land
nHl~' l'P('OYrr thr 111I1011nt hE' has paid if the seller refuses
10 prrfor1l1 t ll(' eontra('t (see JJ O1'CSCO Y. Foppiano. 7 Cal.2d
~~2. 2~7 [60 P.2(14::!01: Best., Restitution, ~ 108(d»), and thr
1'1111' t hat a prl'son ,,-lio rf'nders sprviees under an invalid oral
('OlJtl';wt to <1f'\'isE' proprrt:' may seenre qllfl11t1l111 meruit for
til!' yallir of thosp sPl'Yjpes. (Zellncr Y. lVasslllon, 184 Cal. 80,
RR I] fl:1 P. R41.) A lthOllg-h then> are cases where recover~'
has hrE'1l <1(,11il'l1 drsllitp an appnrent unjnst enrichment (Barr
Y.
'DfllI IIrll, 'i() Cnl. 4fiD [18 P. 429, 9 Am.St.Rep. 242];
1'1'111('1/ Y. IlO"'lIl'd. 7n Cal. ;;2;) 121 P. 984. 12 Am.St.Rep. ]62.
4 hlL\. 82(jl : s(,p. 1l1so. Babcock Y. Ghas(', 111 Cal. 351 r43 P.
1l0.il: N1/8' Y. .lh7)/·I/,~. 1() Cal. 3;)0: r:ra)l Y. Walker. ]()7 Cal.
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381 [108 P. 278] ), in none of them was the question raised or
considered of the availability of the remedy of specific restitution as distinct from the remedy of a constructive trust
based on the abuse of a confidential relationship. In cases
where the question has been considered, however, the right
to relief has been recognized. (Steinberger v. Steinberger,
60 Cal.App.2d 116, 120 [140 P.2d 31] ; Edwards v. Edwards,
90 Cal.App.2d 33, 39 [202 P.2d 589] ; Adams v. Talbott, 61
Cal.App.2d 315, 319 [142 P.2d 775] ; see, also, Sears v. Rule,
27 Ca1.2d 131, 140 [163 P.2d 443] ; Taylor v. Morris, 163 Cal.
717,722 [127 P. 66] ; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481, 485-487.)
Accordingly, it is unneces§ary to decide whether there was a
confidential relationship in this case. The nonsuit must be
reversed if there is evidence, either that plaintiff conveyed
his property in reliance" on an oral promise to reconvey it to
him, or that the conveyance was induced by fraud.
[7] Although there is no evidence that May authorized
her mother to solicit the conveyance, plaintiffs contends that
there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that she ratified the transaction undertaken in her behalf. In this respect
the record shows that May accepted and recorded the deed.
She allowed plaintiff and his wife to live on the Harder Road
property after the deed to her was executed. She also allowed them to live on the Winton Road property and the
Santa Cruz property. She stated to her parents that she
thought they were making a mistake in buying the Santa Cruz
property, but nevertheless she provided the funds for its
purchase from the proceeds of the sale of the Winton Road
property. She stated to plaintiff that she did not see. why
he wanted to spend money in repairs of the Santa Cruz
property, "but it is your money, you can do so," and she
supplied the funds for the repairs.
This course of conduct is consistent with a recognition on
May's part that she was acting as trustee for plaintiff with
respect to his real estate transactions and the profits realized
therefrom. From her cooperation in selling the Winton Road
property and buying the SantaCruz property, despite her
own disapproval, the trier of facts could reasonably infer an
admission that the property was plaintiff's and not hers.
Similarly her providing the money that she described as
"your money," suggests that she acknowledged that she held
the profits from the sale of the Winton Road property in
trust for plaintiff.

Mar. 1952]

ORELLA

v. JOHNSON

699

[38 C.2d 693; 242 P.2d 91l

Plaintiff also introduced evidence of a conversation between
himself and May 's dall~hter at which May was present. This
conversation took plaee after plaintiff's wife's death. Plaintiff
asked the daughter what her mother intended to do with the
property, and the daughter replied, "You know Ma is holding
that property for you; that property is yours."
The most compelling evidence in plaintiff's favor, however, either on the theory that May ratified her mother's
arrangement with plaintiff or on the theory that the conveyance was procured by the mother's fraud, is the fact that May
accepted and recorded the dee<l. When plaintiff's wife delivered plaintiff's deed to defendant, the latter was put on
inquiry as to the purpose of the conveyance. (Phillips v.
Phillips, 163 Cal. 530, 534-535 [127 P. 346] ; Ballard v. Nye,
138 Cal. 588, 599 [72 P.156].) It may reasonably be inferred
that her mother either informed her of the arrangement by
which she secured the deed or fabricated a story with respect
thereto. In the former case, May's acceptance of the deed
with knowledge of the facts would constitute a ratification
of the agency and make her mother's negotiations in her
behalf binding upon her. (Civ. Code, § 1589; AiroZa v. Gorham, 56 Cal.App.2d 42, 49 [133 P.2d 78] ; Moody v. Judah
Boas Finance Corp., 93 Cal.App. 21, 25-26 [268 P. 974].) If,
on the other hand, May neither authorized her mother to act
in her behalf nor was informed by her mother of the arrangements that were made with plaintiff, it is clear from plaintiff's
offer of proof that he was induced to part with his property
because of fraudulent representations made to him by his wife.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,

J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the jUdgment.

